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Abstract:  
In R (Wang Yam) v Central Criminal Court the Supreme Court has held that the domestic courts enjoy an 
inherent jurisdiction to make orders which have the effect of preventing an applicant to the Court of Human Rights 
from putting material before that court. This analysis considers the decision in the context of the growth of ‘secret 
trials’ in the domestic criminal system, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision may merely postpone a dispute 
between the UK and the Strasbourg Court on the implications of this growth in secrecy for the UK’s compliance 
with the Convention.  
Introduction 
The decision of the Supreme Court in R (Wang Yam) v Central Criminal Court 1 speaks to two 
important themes of the modern constitutional era: the expansion in the forms of secrecy which 
are available in the domestic courts (and their knock-on effects) and the relationship between the 
domestic legal system and the ECHR regime. Though it confirms that the English courts’ 
inherent jurisdiction is capable of being exercised in a manner which effectively prevents an 
applicant to the Court of Human Rights from putting material before that Court, it does not 
mark the end of the applicant’s legal travails, nor does it preclude the possibility that the spread 
of secrecy through the domestic legal system will (again) bring the United Kingdom into conflict 
with the Convention system. 
Background 
It is by now clear that the English courts enjoy the power to order a criminal trial to take place, 
wholly or in part, in camera, with press and public excluded, where necessary in order to protect 
the public interest against harm that would be caused by the disclosure, as part of the trial 
                                                          
1 R (Wang Yam) v Central Criminal Court [2015] UKSC 76. 
process, of sensitive information.2 While analogous powers exist in statute,3 the courts have not 
tended to rely upon any enactment in making an in camera order. Instead, they have asserted that 
they do so under their inherent jurisdiction as courts of law to make such orders as are necessary 
in order to do justice in the case before them.4 Though the fact that they enjoy such a power 
seems now uncontroversial (and was not contested here),5 the courts have a distance to go in 
terms of articulating and exploring the circumstances in which such an order will be justified, and 
the limits placed upon it by (common law) constitutional principle. In the context of first-order 
disputes regarding whether and when an in camera order can be made, however, the Convention 
Rights have played little role – the Convention clearly endorses the possibility of excluding the 
press and public from criminal trials where “strictly necessary” in the interests of, amongst other 
things, national security6 – with the key questions instead whether the interests of justice require 
the making of the order (because, without such a thing, there is a real risk that the prosecution 
will be discontinued) and whether the making of the order would be unfair to the defendant (in 
which case the order cannot be made no matter the consequences). 7 
More pressingly, the effect of an in camera order cannot logically cease with the conclusion of the 
trial in respect of which it is made: to protect the public interest against the harm that would be 
caused by the disclosure of the material whose sensitivity saw that order made in the first place, 
the order in question (or associated orders) must, it seems, prohibit the disclosure of that 
material indefinitely. These consequential orders – also made under the courts’ inherent 
jurisdiction8 – can have a striking effect. They can prevent courts which have considered the 
matter from publishing their judgments in full, requiring them instead to redact the version 
which is made available to the public, 9  and can require that redaction to carry over into 
subsequent civil claims.10 But they cannot, of course, prevent other courts from considering the 
in camera material – at least not the domestic courts: if material could be considered at trial but 
not on appeal, justice would not be seen to be done and would likely not in fact be done.11 The 
present case, arising out of the conviction of Wang Yam for the murder, in 2006, of the retired 
                                                          
2 See R v The Crown Court at the Central Criminal Court Ex p. A [2006] EWCA Crim 4; R v Wang Yam [2008] 
EWCA Crim 269; Guardian News and Media Ltd v Incedal [2014] EWCA Crim 1861.  
3 See, e.g., Official Secrets Act 1913 s.8(4). 
4 See R v Wang Yam [2008] EWCA Crim 269, [5]-[6]. 
5 The point was not contested by counsel for Wang Yam, though given that has never been decided by 
the Supreme Court, there must remain the possibility of it being contested in that forum on some future 
occasion.  
6 See, e.g., Welke and Białek v Poland (15924/05), 1 March 2011.  
7 The most detailed consideration of the issues is found in Guardian News and Media Ltd v Incedal [2014] 
EWCA Crim 1861. 
8 E.g., R (Yam) v Central Criminal Court [2014] EWHC 3558 (Admin), [55]: “the court must have an 
inherent power to issue ancillary order or direction whose express object is to secure the purpose of the 
order made in court.”  The courts in the course of the litigation have also relied upon powers under s. 12 
of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 and s.11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981: see Wang Yam v 
Attorney General (27 February 2014), [75]-[79]. 
9 See, e.g., R v Khyam [2008] EWCA Crim 1612. 
10 See, e.g., Amin v Director General of the Security Service [2013] EWHC 1579 (QB) 
11 See, e.g., Bank Mellatt v HM Treasury (No.1) in which the Supreme Court (albeit considering closed 
rather than in camera material) started from the proposition that “the Supreme Court can conduct a closed 
material procedure where it is satisfied that it may be necessary to do so in order to dispose of an appeal” 
([43]) and held that none of the countervailing factors identified were sufficient to outweigh that power.  
writer Allan Chapelow, raised the distinct question of whether the inherent jurisdiction can be 
used to make orders consequent to an in camera order which have the effect of preventing an 
individual from putting the in camera material before the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg pursuant to an application to that Court.12 Though the rules of the Strasbourg Court 
permit the non-disclosure of material put before it where that material’s disclosure would be 
harmful on, inter alia, national security grounds,13 and the Court may hold private hearings in 
order to consider it, 14  the Supreme Court has decided the such orders are not inherently 
incompatible with either the ECHR nor English law.  
Procedural history 
The procedural history of the case must be outlined briefly. In 2007, Ousely J at the Central 
Criminal Court made an in camera order in respect of Wang Yam’s trial. The order was affirmed 
by the Court of Appeal, which considered the in camera material and delivered a closed 
judgment. 15 Having been convicted of murder (after a retrial) and appealed (unsuccessfully) 
against that conviction (based partly on the claim that the in camera order rendered the conviction 
unsafe),16 Wang Yam made an application to the Strasbourg court, challenging the compatibility 
of his conviction with Article 6 ECHR.17 Having done so, he sought to confirm that the original 
order did not prevent reference being made to that material in his response to the UK’s 
observations; should it, as originally framed, prevent such reference, he sought to have the terms 
of the order varied to allow it. Ouseley J in fact responded by varying the terms of the order to 
make explicit what had been uncertain – that to make reference to the relevant material before 
the Strasbourg Court was prohibited.18 The varied order was challenged by way of judicial review 
(before a Divisional Court which had not seen the in camera material), with permission to bring 
the judicial review granted but the substantive claim dismissed.19 Though permission to appeal 
was refused, a question was certified for a leapfrog appeal to the Supreme Court, in which the 
case was heard by a panel of seven judges.  
The Supreme Court’s decision 
The Supreme Court (whose judgment was given by Lord Mance, with whom the six other judges 
agreed) unanimously dismissed the appeal in a judgement which belies any impression given by 
the size of the panel that a constitutionally controversial decision was imminent. Because the 
challenge was to the underlying legal power rather than to its exercise in this case,20 the appellant 
was required to argue that an order can never be made which has the effect of preventing an 
applicant putting material before the Strasbourg Court; that, first, an order which has that effect 
is necessarily contrary to the Convention and therefore, second, domestic courts have, under 
                                                          
12 Application 31295/11, lodged 28 April 2011.  
13 Article 40 (2) ECHR. 
14  For that possibility see Article 40 (1) ECHR: “Hearings shall be in public unless the Court in 
exceptional circumstances decides otherwise”. 
15 R v Wang Yam [2008] EWCA Crim 269. 
16 Wang Yam v R [2010] EWCA Crim 2072. 
17 Wang Yam v United Kingdom, application no. 31295/11. 
18 Wang Yam v Attorney General (27 February 2014). 
19 R (Yam) v Central Criminal Court [2014] EWHC 3558. 
20 R (Wang Yam) v Central Criminal Court [2015] UKSC 76, [20]. 
English law, no power to make such an order. Both arguments were rejected by the Supreme 
Court.  
(a) The position under the ECHR 
Two provisions of the ECHR were considered by the Supreme Court to be relevant to the 
order’s compliance with the Convention – Article 34 (on which the appellant had relied) and 
Article 38 (on which he had not, the interpretation of it which had prevailed at earlier stages of 
the litigation being unfavourable to his case). By Article 34, parties to the Convention “undertake 
not to hinder in any way the effective exercise” of the right to make an application to the Court 
of Human Rights and it was argued here that an order preventing Wang Yam from putting the in 
camera material before the Strasbourg court was a hindrance to the pursuit of his application even 
though that original application had itself been made without difficulty – the case is therefore 
distinguishable from the classic ‘hindrance’ cases in which national authorities use more or less 
overt methods to dissuade the victim of a breach of the Convention rights from applying to the 
Court or to persuade the victim to withdraw an application once made. Neither before Ouseley J 
(hearing the application to vary the order so as to permit reference to be made to the in camera 
order) nor at first instance in the application for permission to bring a judicial review against 
Ouseley J’s revised order, was Article 34 point considered directly. In the Supreme Court, it was 
dealt with briefly and, largely via a reassertion of earlier findings that it was both necessary and 
fair to hold the material in camera and that attempts to argue that publication of that material 
would have assisted the applicant’s defence had repeatedly rejected (at trial and on appeal). The 
relevance of these facts to the Article 34 point must be doubted, and the analysis of the point as 
a whole leaves much to be desired. Though the Supreme Court’s conclusion on this point must 
be correct, in light of the spread of in camera orders (on one occasion paired with anonymization 
of the defendants), 21  a fuller consideration of how far the courts might go in limiting 
communication with the Court of Human Rights would have been most welcome. 
More significant to the disposal of the case was Article 38 – often treated by the Court as the 
corollary of Article 3422 – which states that the Court will examine the case and “if need be, 
undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties 
concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities.” The procedure put in place by Article 38 
therefore clearly envisages that it will be the Strasbourg Court which decides which if any 
material it requires in order to determine the complaint and so whether, for example, to decide 
an Article 6 claim founded upon part of a trial having taken place in camera requires an 
examination of material not publicly aired. The Strasbourg jurisprudence canvassed by the 
Supreme Court differs from the present case – in which the material was known to the applicant 
and has been deployed by him before the domestic courts – in that it relates to situations where 
the material was kept from the applicant. That jurisprudence shows that the Court of Human 
Rights will – because it is not well-placed to assess claims about what national security requires in 
terms of disclosure and non-disclosure – concern itself in the first place with the process by 
which decisions as to disclosure are arrived at rather than itself (re-)determining where the 
                                                          
21 Guardian News and Media Ltd v Incedal [2014] EWCA Crim 1861 (the anonymization was overturned by 
the Court of Appeal). 
22 See, e.g., Janowiec v Russia (2013) 58 EHRR 792, [209]. 
balance of the public interest in disclosure and non-disclosure lies, and even then only where the 
process is being cited by the High Contracting Party to justify its failure to provide the Court 
with the material it seeks. Where, for example, the Court had found Russia to have breached 
Article 38 in relation to a complaint arising out of the Katyn massacre in Poland in 1940 (by 
failing to provide the Court with a copy of the decision discontinuing criminal proceedings) the 
nature of the breach was primarily a procedural one, relating to the quality of the domestic legal 
process whose conclusion was cited as justification for the non-disclosure. In particular, the 
domestic courts had failed properly to scrutinise the claim that national security considerations 
prevented that document’s disclosure.23 The Strasbourg court was not required to take a view on 
the substance of the national security claim.  
The second case on which the Supreme Court relied – Al Nashiri v Poland 24  – was treated 
unconvincingly. There, Poland was held to have breached Article 38 by reason of its failure to 
disclose the findings of inquiries into a CIA detention facility operated in Poland. The Supreme 
Court is strangely ambiguous as to the basis of that finding, which the judgment of the 
Strasbourg Court shows to have at least two strands. First, the absence of procedural safeguards 
guaranteeing the confidentiality of the material if handed over to Strasbourg was, the Court of 
Human Rights made clear, insufficient justification to avoid a breach of Article 38, 25 given that 
(as noted above) the Strasbourg Court has the ability to restrict public access to documentation 
placed before it in the interests of national security, and to hold in camera hearings if necessary. 
Second, Polish domestic legal impediments could not justify a failure to act in accordance with 
Article 38. 26 This fuller account of the decision in Al-Nashiri, together with the decision in 
Janowiec, gives some sense of how events might now unfold. First, as the Supreme Court notes, it 
is true that it is by no means inevitable that the Strasbourg Court will ask disclosure to be made 
to it of the material subject to the in camera regime. As such, its conclusion on this first point – 
that an order which prevents an applicant putting material before the Court of Human Rights is 
not per se incompatible with the Convention – must again be correct. Nevertheless, the decision 
as to what material to request belongs to the Court of Human Rights alone, 27  and so the 
possibility remains that it will take the view that, given that its own rules provide for sufficient 
secrecy as to overcome any concern regarding the consequences of disclosing the in camera 
material, the Article 6 complaint cannot be determined without sight of that material. If (as it 
surely would) the United Kingdom refuses, it will not suffice by way of justification to cite the 
(varied) in camera order. Instead, the United Kingdom will point to the multiple Ministerial 
certificates produced by the executive, the repeated acceptance by courts which have themselves 
seen the in camera material that the balance of the public interest lies where the executive asserts 
that it does, and – most crucially – the fact that Wang Yam has been able to judicially review the 
most recent decision sustaining the in camera order. It will on that basis argue that the domestic 
legal process is sufficiently robust as to have allowed an effective challenge to the assertion that 
national security requires that the material be withheld. Counting against the government to 
some extent might be the poorly-understood law of in camera trials, which has never been the 
                                                          
23 Ibid, [214]. 
24 Al Nashiri v Poland (2014) 60 EHRR 393. 
25 Ibid, [365]. 
26 Ibid, [366]. 
27 Ibid, [355].  
subject of direct consideration by the Supreme Court and which has been dealt with rather 
cursorily by the Court of Appeal when it has had occasion to consider the question. As things 
stand, however, the government will be able to highlight the failure of Wang Yam to challenge 
the specific exercise of the inherent jurisdiction which saw the non-disclosure regime put in place 
continued by Ouseley J, in favour of challenging instead the legal principles which permitted that 
exercise. Fairly or not, the decision not to challenge the appropriateness of the continuation in 
the present case was the subject of pointed comment by Lord Mance,28 who implied that such a 
challenge might yet be brought.29 In such an event, the Supreme Court may need to hold an in 
camera hearing in order to review the material subject to the in camera regime. And, ultimately, 
even if the Court of Human Rights accepts that the in camera material need not be produced, its 
case law suggests that it may well seek a redacted or summary version of the material. The failure 
to produce the material (or a summary thereof) without a justification acceptable to the 
Strasbourg Court would represent a breach of Article 38. 
(b) The domestic legal position 
Its conclusion as to the relevant international legal position renders strictly obiter the Supreme 
Court’s consideration of whether that question of international law is relevant to the domestic 
legality of the order made by Ouseley J. The point is that, as is well-known, the mechanism by 
which the Convention was transposed into domestic law distinguishes the substantive rights 
from other, mostly procedural, provisions.30 In particular, the two Articles crucial to the question 
of international legality – 34 and 38 – were not incorporated into domestic law. The question 
therefore segues into that of the (domestic) legal status of unincorporated provisions of 
international treaties, of which the Convention is of course only the most prominent example. 
Here, the answer offered is resolutely orthodox: the dualism of the United Kingdom 
constitutional order, whereby international legal provisions are available in domestic law only 
where Parliament has legislated to make them so, is bluntly reaffirmed.31 Unsurprisingly, given 
that we are in the realm of procedure rather than substance, no mention is made of the nascent 
heterodox approach to this issue visible in, for example, the judgment of Lord Kerr in the 
‘benefits cap’ case,32 whereby (on the basis that the rule against enforcement of unincorporated 
treaties is aimed at preventing the interests of the citizen from being harmed without 
Parliament’s agreement) treaties which protect the individuals’ rights (and to which the logic of 
the general rule does not therefore apply) are given effect even where unincorporated.33 Such an 
exception would of course be doubly controversial in the context of a treaty such as the ECHR, 
some of whose provisions have been transposed into domestic law, and the provisions which 
were not can therefore reasonably be assumed to have been very deliberately excluded by 
Parliament (and excluded for, in the case of procedural provisions, good reason). Even the more 
limited (but still heterodox) claim that a domestic decision maker might be required to consider a 
country’s obligations under international law when exercising a discretion finds no purchase. 
First, that claim – where it has been made – applies only to ‘fundamental’ rights, and to the 
                                                          
28 [2015] UKSC 76, [20] and [34]. 
29 Ibid, [34]. 
30 Human Rights Act 1998, s.1. 
31 [2015] UKSC 76, [35]. 
32 R (SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16. 
33 Ibid, [255]-[256]. 
extent that Article 34 in fact (as a corollary of Article 38, perhaps) creates any obligation on the 
United Kingdom, Lord Mance is of the view that the obligation is not ‘fundamental’.34 Second, 
even it were, there is no mechanism by which the obligation and associated right might be 
brought to bear on the judge’s exercise of his discretion in making the order – the principle of 
legality applies only to rights available in domestic law. Third, had there been any obligation to 
take account of the relevant provisions of unincorporated treaties, it is clear that Ouseley J would 
– notwithstanding his eventual conclusion – have done enough to fulfil it.35 Finally, because the 
basis of the in camera order was the inherent jurisdiction rather than a statute, the interpretive 
principle whereby it is assumed that Parliament intended to legislate compatibly with the UK’s 
international obligations is of no significance. 36 In sum, even if the order had been held – 
contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court here – to be incompatible with the Convention, 
that conclusion would not have undermined its domestic legality. On this point also, it seems 
impossible that the Supreme Court could have decided otherwise. 
Conclusion  
Against a background in which the power to hold a criminal trial in camera has quickly become 
uncontroversial (perhaps distressingly so), and the dualist status of the United Kingdom’s 
constitution has been repeatedly reaffirmed in recent times, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wang Yam must count as unsurprising. That is not to say, however, that more difficult questions 
will not arise in future. The most obvious source of future conflict would be a request by the 
Court of Human Rights to the UK Government to supply it with material which contains those 
facts kept from public view during Wang Yam’s trial. Given the efforts made so far by the 
executive to keep that material out of the public domain (and the repeated assertion that national 
security would be harmed by its disclosure) it must be anticipated that any such request will be 
refused, potentially placing the UK in breach of its obligations under the Convention. Such a 
scenario would introduce a new and interesting dynamic into contemporary disputes about the 
international rule of law 37  – the government citing its domestic legal obligations to justify 
resisting those of international law. All the while, the substance of the claim – that the in camera 
trial constituted a violation of Wang Yam’s Article 6 rights – remains to be determined, and 
might well be determined without the Court of Human Rights having sight of the material in 
question. Not only is the Court permitted to draw “such inferences as it deems appropriate” 
from any hypothetical failure by the UK to supply the in camera material,38 but the point has also 
been made by Ouseley J that the “insignificance” of that material might not be appreciated by 
those who have not seen it.39 Any such failure – whether or not in the face of a request by the 
Strasbourg Court – therefore makes it more rather than less likely that a breach of the Article 6 
claim will be found. More speculatively, the case law on open justice in English law has been able 
to retain its focus on the relevant common law principles in large part because there are many 
questions on which the effect of these principles is (or is assumed to be) identical to that of the 
application of the relevant provisions of the ECHR. Should those two sets of norms diverge, 
                                                          
34 [2015] UKSC 76, [36]. 
35 Wang Yam v Attorney General (27 February 2014), [51]. 
36 [2015] UKSC 76, [35]. 
37 In particular surrounding the re-writing of the Ministerial code in late 2015. 
38 Rule 44C (1) of the ECHR. 
39 Wang Yam v Attorney General (27 February 2014), [61]. 
however, and the Convention come to require a higher standard of procedural protection than is 
offered by the common law, a more direct clash between the United Kingdom and the Council 
of Europe – of the sort now familiar from the context of prisoners’ right to vote – might follow.  
 
